29.1. This chapter considers the local governance arrangements to address Auckland’s disaster resilience. In Auckland, possible disasters include natural disasters (e.g. tropical cyclones, tsunami, and volcanic eruptions), technological disasters (e.g. electricity supply failure (see Chapter 28, “Electricity”)), and biological emergencies (e.g. human and animal epidemics).1 Among the most likely disasters are tropical cyclones and flooding. A recent training exercise was based on a scenario of a volcanic eruption;2 however, this is not a high probability risk. Resilience in the face of gradual changes such as climate change, as distinct from sudden disasters, is discussed later in this chapter.
29.2. Rod Oram, in “Auckland 2060”, a futuristic “think piece” written for the Commission, imagined some future disasters and new responses that might occur 50 years into the future:
When things go wrong … they can do so in spectacular fashion. Last week, a nano-biotechnology plant in Rodney suffered a serious failure.
A huge global response kicked in almost instantaneously. Thanks to the power of Web 17.0, our emergency services were helped from around the world to model the potential disaster in real-time in virtual reality. So, thankfully no crisis developed. A monitoring drone is still hovering high in the sky over the site. It’s directing the army of robots still seeking out and capturing the escaped nano-particles with the help of overseas expertise.3
And, moving from the technological to the natural world,
Last night’s storm … had the emergency services out. As expected, climate change has brought a 40-cm rise in sea level in the past 50 years. And weather events are more extreme and frequent. The good news is temperatures are only a couple of degrees higher.
We’ve built well to adapt but we always worry about storm surges. And we worry a lot about the unexpected. Just a month ago, severe earth tremors along the Kerepehi Fault – under the Hauraki Plain and into the Firth of Thames – caused a series of small tsunamis. They did a lot of damage both sides – Seabird Coast and the Coromandel – and up to the eastern beaches of Waiheke.4
29.3. Whether these ideas become the reality or not, there can be no doubt that effective responses to old and new hazards will be needed in the future if the city is to minimise the damage and disruption from a disaster or emergency.
29.4. Resilience is the term given to describe the ability of a community to withstand and recover from stress, disruption, or shock, and rebuild itself. Four areas of activity are commonly identified to build resilience, known as the “4Rs”:
29.5. For the first R – reduction of risk – a range of central and local government policies contribute to disaster resilience. Well-known examples include earthquake strengthening of buildings, planning controls to avoid development in hazard areas, and spare capacity in lifeline utilities, for example by providing additional water storage and spare electricity and telecommunications circuits. (Lifeline utilities are the essential infrastructure and services that support the life of communities. They include services such as water, wastewater, stormwater, telecommunications, electricity, and gas, as well as transport networks such as road, rail, airports, and ports.)6
29.6. The two Rs of readiness and response require collaborative action between councils to address emergencies, and these are the main focus of this chapter.
29.7. The last R, recovery, is important to councils, especially as councils own infrastructure such as roads and bridges that are vulnerable to hazards. The rebuilding costs can be extremely high and necessitate radical revision of annual budgets after a disaster. The Commission considers that if governance of civil defence emergency management (“CDEM”) is adequate to cover the acute stage of an emergency, it will be adequate to deal with recovery.
29.8. Emergencies are addressed by local government through a statutory framework contained in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (“CDEM Act”). The CDEM Act establishes a central government agency, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, and also imposes CDEM responsibilities on local authorities. Responsibility for CDEM is thus split between local and central government.
29.9. The purposes of the CDEM Act include to
29.10. The CDEM Act defines “hazard” and “emergency”. A hazard is “something that may cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of, an emergency”, in which respect,
29.11. These definitions give CDEM a very wide mandate to address the effects of natural hazards, potential pandemics such as bird flu, terror attacks, and failures of utilities such as water supplies or electricity distribution among other things.
29.12. Central government takes responsibility under the CDEM Act for identifying hazards of national significance, and publishing national strategies and plans.9 It has published a National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2007, which sets out five principles to guide action and underpin the success of CDEM in New Zealand:
29.13. Central government also monitors the performance of CDEM groups and manages national civil defence emergencies, as well as taking wider roles, for example through security agencies in relation to terrorism, health agencies in regard to pandemics, and State-owned enterprises in regard to electricity generation and distribution.
29.14. The CDEM Act imposes a duty on every regional council and territorial authority to plan and provide for civil defence emergency management within its district. However, the councils do not act individually. The Act requires regional councils and territorial authorities to form CDEM groups in each region.11
29.15. Functions of a CDEM group include to
29.16. A CDEM group operates in Auckland, with all eight councils participating. The Auckland group’s political governance comes from councillors representing each council, who meet regularly at CDEM group meetings, as a joint standing committee of the constituent councils.13 Budgets are approved for the expenses of the group and funded on an agreed basis by the councils.14 Budgets have increased significantly in recent years, reflecting an increase in group activities, to cover increased staff and the opening of a group emergency operations centre in 2008. The budget for 2008–09 was $1.7 million.
29.17. Executive governance of the Auckland Region CDEM Group is undertaken by a Co-ordinating Executive Group (“CEG”), which nominally comprises the chief executive of each council, but is usually attended by second- and third-level managers deputised by the chief executives.15 In addition, the CEG includes representatives from New Zealand Police, New Zealand Fire Service, St John, Auckland Regional Public Health Service, the three district health boards, Auckland Engineering Lifelines Group, and the Auckland region’s CDEM group controller as full voting members. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management has a non-voting representative. Various subcommittees are set up to deal with particular “portfolios” such as public education and risk reduction.
29.18. Routine work of the group is done in-house by six employees, who are employed by Auckland Regional Council (“ARC”), although they report to the CEG.
29.19. The group has adopted the Auckland Region CDEM Group Plan. This sets the strategic direction, operation, and administrative arrangements for CDEM in Auckland. It expresses its vision as “A resilient Auckland region”, with resilience describing as a prepared community that bounces back quickly after an emergency.16
29.20. As well as contributing to the group, individual territorial authorities maintain their own CDEM organisations. Throughout the region, 18 people are employed by territorial authorities in specific CDEM roles. These people might be described as facilitators. Many more council staff participate on an occasional basis in CDEM training and provide the bulk of the workforce during emergencies.17 Each territorial authority pays the costs of its local CDEM effort, in addition to its contribution to the group budget.
29.21. A degree of local autonomy within a region is consistent with the CDEM Act. For example, the Act allows for a person nominated by a group, or the mayor of a city or district, to declare a state of emergency.18 While mayors are limited to declaring a state of emergency within their own districts, the person appointed by the group may declare in respect of one or more districts.
29.22. There is also a general requirement in the CDEM Act for local authorities to plan and provide for CDEM within their districts.19 This could be satisfied by a comprehensive group plan supplemented by simple documentation covering any additional needs of each district. However, the Auckland councils have each provided an elaborate local CDEM plan for their districts, following a common template.20 The local plans emphasise local operational response and recovery activities for local emergencies, and procedures for transferring responsibility to the CDEM group for an emergency that becomes regionally significant.
29.23. The North Shore City CDEM Local Plan is a typical example. It states hazards applicable in North Shore City, and operational principles and arrangements, including recruitment of volunteers.21 The plan also lists the membership of the North Shore City Welfare Advisory Group (“WAG”), whose purposes are to provide expertise and guidance, to develop and implement individual welfare response plans, and to participate in training. Members of the WAG include, for example, Age Concern, Asian Liaison Office, Auckland University of Technology, Awataha Marae, Citizens Advice Bureau, various churches, and representatives of Government welfare departments.22
29.24. The WAG and the volunteers are examples of local outreach and integration of CDEM into the community. These fit into the national CDEM strategy principle of individual and community responsibility and self-reliance, but they do not necessarily need to be arranged by territorial authorities. The Commission considers they might just as effectively be arranged by the Auckland Region CDEM Group, and indeed the local WAGs overlap with the group welfare advisory effort.
29.25. The submissions on CDEM are summarised in Volume 3 of the Commission’s report, Chapter 20, “Emergency management and disaster resilience”. Relatively few submitters commented on CDEM. Of those who did, most favoured the regional council being responsible for all CDEM. Few gave detailed reasons; however, one thought a regional committee would function better than the current joint committee structure of the CDEM group. Other points made by submitters included the need to ensure that emergency planning is considered as part of wider planning processes focused on transport, health services, police, ambulance, and fire.23
29.26. Auckland International Airport Ltd noted that the airport is a “lifeline utility” identified in the CDEM Act. The company said that civil defence planning is complex and resource-intensive, with duplication of human resources across lifeline utilities and territorial authorities. It suggested combining existing resources, which would also create fewer bodies, and increase coordination and communication. The airport company’s submission called for simplified governance arrangements and improved city-wide focus and strong leadership, based in part on the deficiencies the company saw in CDEM.24
29.27. The Commission agrees with Auckland International Airport that current CDEM governance is complex. The Commission considers that CDEM arrangements are unnecessarily complex, given the opportunities to regionalise under the CDEM Act.
29.28. The complexity is mainly because of the overlapping organisations of the regional CDEM group and the territorial authorities. The Commission believes that the organisations are not well integrated, and therefore the overall CDEM effort in Auckland region leads to inefficiency and possible loss of operational effectiveness.
29.29. Operational effectiveness has not been tested in an actual emergency in Auckland region since the current arrangements were put in place, so it has not been put to the acid test. A regional training exercise “Ruaumoko” was held in 2008, which was generally considered a success in terms of testing and developing response capabilities. Of issues relevant to governance, there were two important findings:
29.30. Questions about leadership were earlier raised in 2006 in a report by Kestrel Group Ltd, a company commissioned by the Auckland Region CDEM Group to review the capacity and capability of the group to respond to a disaster impacting the Auckland region.26
29.31. Kestrel said in its report that the group’s organisational structure was not providing enough strategic direction for the CDEM sector in the Auckland region. The regional CDEM group, and particularly the CEG, needed to be examined to ensure they were operating at a strategic, direction-setting level rather than focusing on detailed operational issues. Kestrel said that the group had no profile or “presence” from the perspective of external agencies asking, “Who are the Group?”, “Who do I contact?”, “Who is in charge?”, “Who is responsible?”27 Kestrel’s recommendation was to
Increase the strategic effectiveness of the CDEM Group at both governance (joint committee) and executive management (CEG) levels by clarifying roles, responsibilities and accountabilities.28
29.32. No significant changes have been made in response to the Kestrel recommendation quoted. This may be because of the territorial authorities seeing the group as superfluous in most emergencies, because they expect their local CDEM organisations will generally provide the practical response. This explanation would fit with Kestrel’s finding:
The lack of ownership of and commitment to regional CDEM by CDEM Group partners has made it difficult to provide direction to the wider CDEM sector and implement agreed regional projects. In a sense, the CDEM Group is too ‘virtual,’ and there is too much reliance on goodwill and commitment from a few agencies to make things happen.29
29.33. An example of uncoordinated action by territorial councils relates to emergency warning systems. Kestrel commented that councils were providing their own public emergency warning systems because of “a perceived lack of leadership from the Group and MCDEM [Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management] on this issue”. Kestrel said that this was likely to lead to different warning mechanisms, processes, and standards across the group, and urgent coordination and leadership was required to achieve a group-wide agreement as to what needed to happen and by when.30
29.34. Three councils have put in place tsunami warning systems, each using different technology (see Box 29.1). It seems to the Commission that having three different warning systems raises the public education costs inordinately. Warning systems can be effective only if they are intelligible to the people who need to heed the warning. Investment in public education might well exceed investment in the hardware. An all-of-Auckland approach could be supported by ongoing public education through mass media, to a degree that the fragmented approach cannot.
29.35. There are two other levels of CDEM organisation where leadership is fragmented and needs to be improved. The group controller is a part-time appointee, with no regular line management connection to other CDEM staff in the group or in the councils. The Commission is aware that the group controller has extensive statutory command and control powers in an emergency, but considers that overall leadership would be enhanced if the group controller had a continuous management relationship with the local controllers and permanent staff in between emergencies.
Box 29.1 Tsunami warning systems29.36. The permanent CDEM staff is also fragmented. The group staff report to the CEG, but work within the ARC administration, which has the potential to raise tensions when the CEG and ARC have competing interests. The staff employed by the city and district councils have no managerial connection with each other or with the group staff. While there appears to be a high degree of cooperation and goodwill between the various organisations at staff level, a single management and administration structure would have considerable value, in terms of a larger group having greater depth of experience and ability to specialise and in terms of building the team work that is essential to deal with an emergency.
29.37. Building resilience requires the management of sudden disasters, discussed above, and also requires reduction of long-term risks due to gradual changes in the environment. Climate change, peak oil, and the challenges of a city that may be carbon-constrained in future also require a response from local government. These types of issues are addressed through long-term sustainability planning rather than emergency management. Regional governments in other countries have begun to plan for such things as climate change (see Box 29.2).
29.38. The ARC has announced that it is developing a Regional Response to Climate Change and a Regional Energy Strategy, for release in November 2009 as part of the review of the regional policy statement. This initiative is positive; however, the Commission considers that implementation of the eventual plans will not be straightforward, especially if it relies on other agencies. A stronger approach would be to restructure regional governance so that the agency that draws up the plans is also the agency that commissions development. The CDEM governance structure proposed by the Commission covers this aspect.
29.39. The Commission considers that CDEM is best administered regionally. Unified governance would facilitate greater clarity of vision for all those involved and it could better utilise the resources available for CDEM, which are currently fragmented between the councils. Given the Commission’s overall recommendation for the reorganisation of local government in Auckland, by the creation of an Auckland Council as a unitary authority to govern the region, CDEM is an appropriate function of the Auckland Council.
Box 29.2 The King County Climate PlanKing County in Washington State – a large US county with a population of over 1.8 million – has developed a work plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and preparing the region for the impacts of climate change:
King County will develop clear greenhouse gas accountability and limits, and will implement practical, meaningful policies and investments in the following areas: climate-friendly transportation choices; clean fuels, clean energy and energy efficiency; and land use, building design and infrastructure. Many extraordinary efforts are underway on these counts, but we can and must be more ambitious. Bold planning and investments in these areas – i.e. electrified transportation, more public transit, greenhouse gas accounting in capital projects, and expansion of green building practices – are truly the foundation of our bridge to significant greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Simply put, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions we need cleaner cars, fewer cars and cleaner infrastructure. The list of solutions that King County has developed in response to climate impacts information ranges from the Brightwater reclaimed water “backbone,” which will provide relief to the region’s water supply in context of predicted drought, to planned improvements to roads, bridges and seawalls, in context of sea level rise and flooding. It is important to note that in all of these decisions, climate change information is but one factor, and that the decisions King County has made so far also seek to maximize additional benefits of actions to public health, economic development, and environmental protection.
Source: Excerpts from executive summary, 2007 King County Climate Plan (available at www.kingcounty.gov/transportation/CommuteSolutions/Climatechange.aspx, accessed November 2008).
29.40. Emergency management in any part of the Auckland region can be provided on a regional basis. A regional system could maintain emergency operations centres in different parts of the region to manage a range of events. Activities such as recruitment of volunteers and public education can be provided on a regional basis, although there may be a case for the regional body to have local service centres and field workers.
29.41. The Commission proposes that CDEM should be governed by a committee of the Auckland Council, chaired by the Mayor of Auckland. This committee would take over the statutory role of the group joint committee. The involvement of the mayor would be important to give credibility and urgency to the CDEM effort. Members of the committee might include local council chairs.
29.42. Below this, the CEG would be retained, chaired by the Auckland Council Chief Executive. As with the mayor’s involvement, the chief executive’s involvement is important to give status to the CDEM effort. It is important that the CEG should retain the involvement of emergency services and other agencies in the high-level preparation for emergency management. Involvement of the emergency services at this level is a strength of the existing system that should continue.
29.43. The regional CDEM administration would be headed by the civil defence controller, a full-time position that would report to the chief executive. All of the CDEM staff currently employed by various councils would be brought under the management of the controller.
29.44. The Commission envisages that a single CDEM plan, training programmes for staff, volunteer recruitment programmes, and standard operating procedures would be developed for the region by Auckland Council. Local councils would be involved in CDEM planning to help establish local perspectives and preferences. Implementation would be the responsibility of Auckland Council, including implementation by decentralised staff of Auckland Council with roles, for example, in public education, organising volunteers, and management of sub-regional emergency operations centres. Powers in local matters could be delegated by Auckland Council to local councils where appropriate.
29.45. A further aspect of resilience relates to forest and rural fire protection. The New Zealand Fire Service provides firefighting cover to urban fire districts, which in the case of Auckland largely correspond to the areas with high-pressure reticulated water supplies. In urban districts, local authorities assist the fire service by maintaining water supplies, and inspect buildings for fire safety, but have no direct firefighting role.
29.46. Where there is no urban fire district, firefighting coverage is provided by rural fire authorities created under the Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977. Under the Act, territorial authorities play an important role in rural firefighting, either as independent fire authorities, or in conjunction with the Department of Conservation, Ministry of Defence, and forest owners, in various local arrangements. Most rural fire authorities maintain voluntary rural fire forces to provide firefighting capability in the rural area of the fire authority. In Auckland region, all territorial authorities have a role in rural fire protection, as all include rural land (the Hauraki Gulf islands in the case of Auckland City Council.) Waitakere City Council has a combined approach with Rodney District Council. Franklin District Council also has a significant firefighting role, as might be expected with its large rural district, including a number of voluntary rural fire forces.
29.47. Under the proposed new local governance structure, Auckland Council will have all of the powers of territorial authorities conferred by statute, including rural fire protection responsibilities under the Forest and Rural Fires Act. The Auckland Council would appoint a principal rural fire officer, who would advise the council on all relevant matters, including preparation of a rural fire plan. The Commission envisages that there would be additional staff, working at some local council offices, appointed as rural fire officers to carry out routine work. The Commission considers that this role should not be conferred directly on local councils, but sees a likely role for the local councils under delegated authority. The particular tasks that might be delegated will ultimately be decided by Auckland Council, and the Establishment Board will no doubt also give some thought to it.
29A The Auckland Council should govern civil defence emergency management (“CDEM”) on a regional basis, through a committee chaired by the Mayor of Auckland. The committee might include some local council chairs.
29B The Co-ordinating Executive Group should be retained and chaired by the Auckland Council chief executive. Representation of police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency and social services on the Co-ordinating Executive Group should continue.
29C The civil defence controller should head the regional CDEM administration. This should be a full-time position reporting to the chief executive of the Auckland Council, with all CDEM staff reporting to the controller.
29D The Auckland Council should develop a single CDEM plan, training programme for staff, volunteer recruitment programme, and standard operating procedures for the region.
29E Local councils should be involved in CDEM planning and implementation to the extent delegated to them by Auckland Council.
29F The Auckland Council will have all the powers of territorial authorities conferred by statute for rural fire protection, including those under the Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977.
Transition29G At the establishment date of the Auckland Council, the interim chief executive should be in a position to chair the Co-ordinating Executive Group supported by an interim civil defence controller.
1 Auckland Region Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, Auckland Region Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan, 2005, Annex A4, pp. A4-1 to A4-22, lists these hazards and risks in the Auckland region, among others (available at www.auckland.cdemg.org.nz).
2 Exercise Ruaumoko ’08, see www.exerciseruaumoko.co.nz/
3 Oram, Rod, “Auckland 2060”, in Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, Report, Volume 4: Research Papers, Auckland, 2009, p. 582.
4 Ibid., p. 577.
5 National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2007, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 2008, p. 5 (available at www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.NSF/Files/National_CDEM_Strategy/$file/National-CDEM-strategy-2008.pdf, accessed January 2009).
6 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management website, www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.NSF/wpg_URL/For-the-CDEM-Sector-Lifelines-Index?OpenDocument, accessed January 2009.
7 CDEM Act 2002, section 3(a)–(d).
8 CDEM Act 2002, section 4.
9 CDEM Act 2002, section 8(2)(b), (c), and (d).
10 National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2007, pp. 6–7.
11 CDEM Act 2002, section 12.
12 CDEM Act 2002, section 17.
13 CDEM Act 2002, section 12.
14 Auckland Regional Council pays 35% of the group budget, and the territorial authorities share the balance between them, shared pro rata according to population.
15 CDEM Act 2002, section 20 describes functions of CEGs.
16 Auckland Region Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan, section 2.2.1, p. 15. The section expands on the concept of resilience.
17 Auckland City Council, for example, has three full-time CDEM staff, and another 140 staff who are familiar with the operations centre and would assist in an emergency.
18 CDEM Act 2002, section 25.
19 CDEM Act 2002, section 64.
20 Auckland Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan, section 3.1.5. p. 51 calls for local plans.
21 Keay, David and Dearing, Rodney, North Shore City Civil Defence Emergency Management Local Plan 2005, North Shore City Council, North Shore City, 2005, section 2.3, pp. 2–5 and section 4.1, p. 12 (available at www.northshorecity.govt.nz/PDFs/Civil%20Defence/NSCD-local-plan.pdf, accessed January 2009).
22 Ibid., section 5.4, p. 20.
23 Other submissions called for better funding for surf lifesaving and the rescue helicopter, issues that were addressed by Parliament in the Auckland Regional Amenities Funding Act 2008. The Commission makes no recommendation on the matter.
24 Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from Auckland International Airport Ltd, p. 29. (All submissions are available at www.royalcommission.govt.nz.)
25 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, Exercise Ruaumoko ’08: Final Exercise Report, 2008 (available at www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/Files/National%20Exercise%20Programme/$file/ExRuaumoko-FINAL-REPORT-Aug08.pdf, accessed January 2009).
26 Kestrel Group Ltd, Assessment of the Capacity and Capability of the Auckland Region CDEM Group to Respond to a Disaster Impacting the Auckland Region, Volume 1, August 2006 (available at www.auckland.cdemg.org.nz/pdf_files/Kestrel%20Akl%20CapacityandCapability%20Volume1.pdf, accessed January 2009).
27 Ibid., p. 29.
28 Ibid., p. 37.
29 Ibid., p. 29.
30 Ibid., p. 46.
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