13.1. In the preceding chapter, the Commission sets out the principles, or the core values and characteristics, that the Commission believes should be embodied in new local government arrangements for Auckland. In this chapter, the Commission briefly describes some of the main proposals made to it, and the Commission’s evaluation of them, applying those principles.
13.2. Over 3,500 written and 550 oral submissions were made to the Commission, the majority of which addressed the question of local government arrangements, and proposed change of some form or another.1 Suggestions were wide-ranging, relating, variously, to the number and sizes of councils, mayoral powers, representation and participation arrangements, council administration, urban design, social and environmental responsibilities, the role of council entities, and the functioning of councils and council entities. When all of the combinations of views on these elements are considered, the evidence presented almost every conceivable shade of opinion for the Commission’s consideration.
13.3. It is not practicable to describe in this report every suggestion that was made, and to discuss in detail the Commission’s views on each. The approach taken in this chapter is to focus on those alternatives that will assist readers to understand the Commission’s preferred option, and the reasoning process followed by the Commission in developing it. This chapter describes the principal alternatives considered by the Commission under three broad headings:
13.4. Other proposals made to the Commission in specific areas, for example, relating to Māori and minority representation, and in relation to water, transport, and planning, social, and environmental matters, are discussed in separate chapters.
13.5. In broad terms, the submissions made by the existing councils of Auckland represent the range of options presented to the Commission. The council proposals ranged from retaining the status quo with minor amendments, to amalgamating some or all of the existing territorial authorities, through to the creation of a unitary authority with subsidiary community councils. In summary the submissions were as follows:
13.6. The Commission evaluated these options taking into account the principles earlier articulated.
13.7. The “do nothing” option was clearly not appropriate as it would not address any of the problems with the current arrangements identified in other earlier chapters, including weak regional governance and poor community engagement.
13.8. The proposals by the Rodney and Papakura District Councils, and North Shore, Waitakere, and Manukau City Councils were rejected as they would not resolve existing tensions and competition between councils, and did not address the need to create a common identity and purpose for the region. The Commission observes that the submissions of the Rodney and Franklin District Councils were directed principally at protecting the existence of those two councils, with limited regard to regional issues. The further reasons for rejecting the proposal of Franklin District Council are explained in Chapter 18, “Boundaries”.
13.9. The Commission considered the possibility of retaining the existing territorial authorities and limiting their powers, by removing from them responsibilities relating to regional infrastructure and assets and development, and requiring councils to share services. The Commission concluded that this approach would be difficult to implement and would not necessarily achieve the organisational and culture change required.
13.10. The model preferred by the Commission, and ultimately adopted by it, proposed a unitary authority. A unitary authority is one in which the roles of a territorial local authority (that is, a district or city council) and a regional council are combined.
13.11. Submissions by the ARC and Auckland City Council, supporting a unitary authority, were echoed by the Employers and Manufacturers Association and the New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development.10 All proposed an elected unitary authority that would take an all-of-Auckland role for many functions, supported by a number of subsidiary elected bodies to provide local engagement and local services. A comparison of the proposals is contained in Table 13.1.
Table 13.1 Comparison of unitary models: councils and functions
| Employers and Manufacturers Association & NZCID | Auckland Regional Council | Auckland City Council |
| Greater Auckland Council (“GAC”) regional transport water services regional parks and facilities economic development regulation and planning (with local councils) administrative support for local councils employs all staff for Auckland and local councils |
Greater Auckland Authority (“GAA”) arterial roads integrated three waters management economic development waste management building control environmental health manage regional assets planning and policies under RMA employs all staff for Auckland and local councils |
Greater Auckland Council planning, including spatial plan, area, and neighbourhood plans transport water supply, wastewater, and stormwater arts, community, and recreation investments customer service employs all staff for Auckland and local councils |
| 21 local councils allocate funding to community services and amenities, streetscapes, community events, neighbourhood and community support, arts, culture, libraries, local parks, halls, local traffic issues including cycling and walking submit on the GAC’s plans advocate for the community make an annual submission on expenditure |
community councils local roads local community facilities local parks and reserves local urban renewal community development community safety environmental enhancement other functions delegated by GAA |
21 neighbourhood boards traffic measures, local parking, local place initiatives (such as design of park furniture, play equipment, landscaping) budget to complement their decision-making functions contribute to neighbourhood and area plans, and implementing neighbourhood plans |
Note: NZCID, New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development; RMA, Resource Management Act 1991. Source: Submissions to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from the Employers and Manufacturers Association (Northern)/NZCID, Auckland Regional Council, and Auckland City Council (available at www.royalcommission.govt.nz).
13.12. Although they varied in their detail, all three models aligned with the principles for reform identified by the Commission, insofar as they sought to achieve both greater regional effectiveness and local connection. The ARC model was the most developed and was examined in further detail by the Commission. ARC’s “Option 5” included these further elements:
13.13. Taking the ARC model as a starting point, the Commission examined a number of alternatives based on a unitary council model, but with differing numbers of local entities. The ARC did not specify a number, and the Commission considered that, if there were more than 20 local entities, these would be too small to have the capacity to deliver the necessary services.11 Each version considered by the Commission allocated the same mix of functions to the notional Greater Auckland Authority and the local entities, namely, providing broad policy-making powers and regional service delivery to the regional body, and giving the local entities or councils functions related to local service delivery.
13.14. The variations considered by the Commission were a unitary authority with 20, 11, and six local councils respectively (the ARC referred to local councils as “community councils” but there is no material difference).
13.15. The Commission considered that all three models would deliver common identity and purpose, transparency and accountability, and responsiveness, but cost effectiveness considerations rendered the models with 20 and 11 councils unacceptable.
13.16. The 20-local-council model was not developed in detail by the Commission, as it concluded early on that the creation of 20 entirely new entities with new territories would, for uncertain gains, impose high transitional costs on the ratepayers of Auckland and cause major disruption to existing staff and services. This conclusion was borne out by the independent cost analysis undertaken by Taylor Duignan Barry.12
13.17. The Commission also had concerns that 20 local councils might not have the scale or capacity to deal with some functions; for example planning consents might not be able to be delegated to them. There would also be very high ongoing costs involved in arrangements to enable the local councils to interact with each other and the unitary council and a risk that the overarching unitary council could not effectively oversee and monitor 20 local councils. New headquarters and service centres would have to be set up for each entity and there could be significant capital cost involved. It was also anticipated that natural features such as the coastline and Waitakere Ranges would need to be split between local councils in setting boundaries, which, in the Commission’s view, would be contentious and undesirable.
13.18. This model was developed by the Commission as a variation on the 20-local-council model. The Commission gave some thought to the location of boundaries for 11 entities, and also introduced the idea of special management of the Auckland central business district.
13.19. The 11-local-council model considered by the Commission is summarised in Table 13.2.13 It will be seen that the local council boundaries to some extent followed existing territorial boundaries. The main variations from current boundaries were as follows:
13.20. The Commission considered that this model would have been easier to implement than the 20-local-council model, as the departure from existing boundaries was not so marked, and natural features such as the coastline and Waitakere Ranges would, potentially, have been better managed within fewer entities. There would also have been fewer new offices and service centres required, and less disruption to existing communities.
13.21. However, the Commission was mindful that there would still be significant start-up costs, complex transitional arrangements, and potential disruption to staff and the public, at least in the short to medium term. It was not clear that the creation of 11 local councils would have more effectively achieved greater community responsiveness than would be the case for the model proposed by the Commission.Table 13.2 Eleven-local-council model
| New local council | Existing territorial authorities and wards | Estimated population |
| Hibiscus-Albany | Hibiscus Coast Ward (Rodney District Council), 41,000 Northern Ward (North Shore City Council), 77,000 |
118,000 |
| North Harbour | Remainder of North Shore City Council | 143,000 |
| Waitakere | Waitakere City Council, 198,000 | 198,000 |
| Auckland West | Avondale-Roskill Ward (Auckland City Council), 97,000 Eden-Albert Ward (ACC), 72,000 less Eden Terrace, 2,000 |
167,000 |
| Auckland North | Hobson Ward (Auckland City Council), 68,000 Western Bays Ward (ACC), 40,000 Eastern Bays Ward (ACC), 49,000 Gulf islands (ACC), 9,000 less city centre, 36,0001 |
130,000 |
| Auckland East | Tamaki-Maungakiekie Ward (Auckland City Council), 99,000 | 99,000 |
| Howick-Pakuranga | Howick Ward (Manukau City Council), 42,000 Pakuranga Ward (MCC), 40,000 Botany community (MCC), 37,000 |
119,000 |
| Manurewa-Papakura | Manurewa Ward (Manukau City Council), 84,000 Papakura (Papakura District Council), 48,000 less rural areas, Ardmore and Drury, 5,000 |
127,000 |
| Manukau Central | Papatoetoe, Otara, Mangere Wards (Manukau City Council)2 | 141,000 |
| North Rural | Rodney District Council minus Hibiscus Coast Ward | 54,000 |
| South Rural | Franklin District Council, 62,000 plus Clevedon (Manukau City Council), 10,000 plus Ardmore and Drury (Papakura District Council), 5,000 (Onewhero included) |
77,000 |
Notes: ACC, Auckland City Council; CBD, central business district; MCC, Manukau City Council. Table footnotes: 1 Under this model, the city centre would not have a local council, but would be administered directly by Auckland Council. City centre population taken from 2006 Census figures. 2 Existing Manukau City centre is outside this area. Source: Statistics New Zealand, estimate of population, 30 June 2007.
Table 13.3 Proposed model – six local councils
| New local council | Existing territorial authorities, population | Approximate population |
| Rodney | Rodney District Council, 95,000 less Hibiscus Coast Ward (RDC), 41,000 |
54,000 |
| Waitemata | North Shore City Council, 220,000 plus Hibiscus Coast Ward (RDC), 41,000 |
261,000 |
| Waitakere | Waitakere City Council, 198,000 | 198,000 |
| Tāmaki-makau-rau | Auckland City Council, 433,000 less central city and waterfront, 36,0001 |
397,000 |
| Manukau | Manukau City Council, 354,000 less Clevedon (MCC), 10,000 Papakura District Council, 48,000 less rural areas, Ardmore and Drury (PDC), 5,000 |
387,000 |
| Hunua | Franklin District Council, 62,000 plus Clevedon (MCC), 10,000 plus Ardmore and Drury (PDC), 5,000 less Onewhero, 4,000 less Kaiaua, 1,000 |
72,000 |
Notes: PDC, Papakura District Council; MCC, Manukau City Council; RDC, Rodney District Council. Table footnote: 1 The city centre and waterfront will have a community board with delegated powers from the elected Auckland Council. See Chapter 17, “City Centre and Waterfront”. CBD population taken from 2006 Census figures. Source: Statistics New Zealand, estimate of population, 30 June 2007.
13.22. The model recommended by the Commission is summarised in Table 13.3. It comprises a unitary authority consisting of an elected Auckland Council (to function as the local authority) and six local councils with specified local functions. The local councils are largely centred on existing territorial authority districts and therefore able to utilise existing infrastructure and service centres. The model follows more closely the New Zealand tradition of evolutionary change, by keeping the best from existing institutions while making the necessary changes.
13.23. The boundary between Auckland and Waikato regions is proposed to be changed as described in Chapter 18. Within the Auckland region, the Commission considers that it is desirable to have a clear definition of the boundaries between the rural and urban local councils. It proposes that, in general terms, the boundary between rural and urban councils will be the metropolitan urban limit.14 The Commission also proposes that the opportunity should be taken to provide all local councils with Māori names as described in Chapter 16, “Local Councils”.
13.24. Another significant change is to define a specific central city and waterfront area. This area will have a community board but not a local council, and will be under the direct oversight of the Auckland Council. Other changes include placement of the former Hibiscus Coast Ward of Rodney District in the Waitemata Local Council, combining Papakura with Manukau, and transferring the Onewhero and Kaiaua areas to the Waikato District. The rural areas of Manukau and Papakura will be within the Hunua Local Council. All these changes are described in more detail in Chapter 18.
13.25. The Commission tested its preferred option against the other alternatives identified above. In particular, as mentioned in paragraph 13.16, it obtained expert advice in regard to the relative financial costs and benefits of the 20 local council models and the proposed model.15 The results of this analysis clearly favoured the proposed model.
13.26 The other considerations that influenced the Commission to prefer this model for the second tier of local government are as follows:Community boards
13.27. In Chapter 11, “Defining the Problems”, the Commission briefly describes the role currently played by community boards in promoting community engagement. In considering their potential future role, the Commission drew on expert advice16 and the many submissions on community boards made to the Commission.17
13.28. After careful consideration of all the evidence, the Commission concluded that it should not make general provision for community boards in its proposed new governance arrangements. The primary reason is that the establishment of local councils will make community boards unnecessary. In contrast to the boards, local councils will have clearly defined statutory powers and responsibilities, including a requirement to focus on local matters and to have effective community engagement mechanisms. The proposed ward system, which will achieve a ratio of one councillor to a maximum of 20,000 people, will help to ensure a close connection between councillors and communities. As discussed in Chapter 11, it is also expected that local councils will draw on a variety of methods to ensure genuine and meaningful engagement with their communities.
13.29. The general abolition of community boards will be subject to certain exceptions, however. For example, the Commission accepts that there are important differences between island communities in the Hauraki Gulf, and the urban communities that make up the bulk of the Tāmaki-makau-rau Local Council. They have special and distinct characteristics. For this reason, the Commission recommends that the Waiheke and Great Barrier Island Community Boards be retained, with wider decision-making powers than is currently the case under existing delegations from Auckland City Council. In particular, they should have delegated powers to decide how to deliver some local services, including powers to run community halls and reserves, and have a discretionary budget for this purpose. The budget will be fixed under the local council’s community action plan. The Commission anticipates that the community boards for Waiheke and Great Barrier Islands will provide a channel of communication for the islands to the Tāmaki-makau-rau Local Council table, and will provide these communities with a level of local autonomy.
13.30. As discussed in Chapter 17, “City Centre and Waterfront”, the Commission also recommends a community board for the city centre and waterfront area. The City Centre and Waterfront Community Board will draw its delegated powers directly from the elected Auckland Council. These powers will centre on local service delivery, with planning and consenting decisions for this area being made directly by the elected Auckland Council.
13.31. Changes to the Local Government Act 2002 or provision in the proposed Auckland Act18 may be required to provide for the delegated powers of community boards, as well as to provide for the supervision of a community board by a local council rather than a territorial authority.
13.32. The Commission also notes that the Auckland Council will continue to have the power to establish any additional community boards it considers necessary.Changes to democratic and representation arrangements
13.33. Many submitters suggested improvements to the democratic process, including changes to the voting system (currently “first past the post” for all Auckland councils), changes to the electoral term, and to election and representation arrangements.
13.34. Based on the evidence it has heard, the Commission does not consider there to be any fundamental problems with the local electoral system. This is consistent with the findings of the Local Government Commission review in 2008, which concluded that generally the Local Electoral Act 2001 is achieving its statutory purpose of providing flexibility and uniformity, and allowing for diversity.19
13.35. A number of submitters proposed that in future, councils should adopt single transferable voting. The Commission makes no recommendation on this, because it was not persuaded that the adoption of this voting system would assist in solving Auckland’s problems. It proposes that the 2010 local body elections in Auckland be held under the first-past-the-post system. The Auckland Council would not be precluded from changing to an alternative voting system in future, in accordance with the provisions of the Local Electoral Act.
13.36. A number of submitters proposed that councils in Auckland should be elected for a four-year term. At present the Local Electoral Act requires local elections at three-yearly intervals. Accordingly, council elections were held in October 2001, 2004, and 2007, and the next will be in 2010.20 This timing means that local elections do not clash with parliamentary elections, which are also on a three-yearly cycle, having been held in 2002, 2005, and 2008.
13.37. The Royal Commission on the Electoral System in 1986 traversed the arguments for and against a four-year parliamentary term.21 Some of those arguments are relevant to local government elections, in particular, two arguments based on effective government: first, that a four-year term would allow more time to develop, introduce, and implement policies; and secondly, that it would reduce undesirable election year influences.22 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System supported a four-year parliamentary electoral term on the basis of these arguments, albeit with some reservations arising in the central government context that are not relevant here.23
13.38. This Commission considers that introduction of a four-year electoral term would produce more effective local governance. It would potentially enable difficult long-term decisions to be addressed more effectively by providing a better opportunity to develop, implement, and judge policies. A four-year term would also provide greater certainty (owing to less frequent policy changes) and more time for councils to deliver on their electoral mandates.
13.39. The Commission agrees that holding elections less frequently would have the additional effect of reducing undesirable election-year influences, which include the possibility of councillors making decisions for short-term political advantage, and avoiding important decisions that are controversial or will offend some sections of the electorate. A longer term would also enable individual councillors to become more effective. They would have more time to build specialised knowledge and good working relationships with the various sectional interests in the community.
13.40. Despite these advantages the Commission has concluded that it would be inappropriate to recommend a four-year term for the Auckland Council without wider consideration being given to this issue by the Government. However, in light of its view that a four-year term would benefit Auckland governance, the Commission does recommend that the Government should again consider generally the question of whether the local government electoral term and, if appropriate, the parliamentary term, should be extended to four years.
13.41. Several submitters referred to the ward system currently used by all councils. Some wanted wards to be retained, but others thought that councillors would have more accountability to Auckland if they were elected at large. There was some support for a mixture of wards and at-large elections. Most support for the ward system came from Hauraki Gulf submitters, who felt that a councillor elected on a ward basis could best represent the unique character of the gulf, and make the best decisions for them.24
13.42. Under existing legislation, councillors may be elected either in at-large elections, or in wards, or by a mixture of the two. The election of all councillors at large means all councillors are elected by all voters across the city as a whole. Under a ward system, the city is divided into areas (or wards), and candidates are elected by the voters in each area (or ward). With a mixture of at-large voting and wards, some councillors are elected by the city as a whole, and others in wards. The Local Electoral Act requires a six-yearly review of the basis of the voting system by each territorial authority, and where wards exist, a review of the ward boundaries.25
13.43. The main advantages of an at-large system of election are said to be, first, that at-large elections attract better candidates because successful candidates must appeal to a wide range of people; and secondly, that the councillors so elected make decisions for the good of the entire city or region, not just one geographic or social segment of it.26
13.44. The principal benefit of election by wards is said to be that it produces a council that is more representative of different groups or at least geographical areas within the city. Wards can ensure that the council is not dominated by a single group of people who are interested in only one area of the city. A ward system may result in more candidates from ethnic or other minorities being elected, if those minorities are more concentrated in particular areas.27
13.45. The Commission proposes that councillors on the Auckland Council should be elected by a mixture of ward and at-large representation, in order to deliver the advantages of both systems. Local councils should be elected on the basis of wards, reflecting the community focus of those bodies.
13A The Government should give consideration to the introduction of a four-year electoral term for local authorities in New Zealand.
1. See Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, Report, Volume 3: Summary of Submissions, Auckland, 2009 (available at www.royalcommission.govt.nz).
2. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from Auckland Regional Council, p. 12. (All submissions are available at www.royalcommission.govt.nz.)
3. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from Rodney District Council, pp. 2–3.
4. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from the North Shore City Council, p. 3.
5. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from Waitakere City Council, pp. 8, 39.
6. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from Auckland City Council, p. 4.
7. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from Manukau City Council, pp. 3–4, 17.
8. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from Papakura District Council, pp. 7, 45.
9. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from the Franklin District Council, p. 6.
10. Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from the Employers and Manufacturers Association (Northern), p. 3; and submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance from the New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development, p. 4. The former submission was supported by the New Zealand Retailers Association and some private individuals but opposed by others.
11. The other submitters mentioned in Table 13.1 suggested 21 local entities.
12. Taylor Duignan Barry, Financial Analysis: Re-organisation of the Councils in the Auckland Region, February 2009 (report appended as Appendix B). See also Chapter 32, “Achieving a High-Performance Auckland Council”.
13. The population figures in Tables 13.2 and 13.3 are estimates to show the relative size of local councils’ populations. These were estimated using available figures for existing councils, wards, and census area units likely to be included in each local council. The estimates count the whole populations of wards and area units under one local council, with no adjustment to take into account changes to territorial boundaries, for example to align boundaries with the metropolitan urban limit. As discussed later, the exact boundaries of the local council areas need to be defined by the Local Government Commission, and accurate population calculations will only then be possible.
14. Chapter 18, “Boundaries”, p. .
15. See Appendix B, Taylor Duignan Barry report.
16. Richardson, Mike, “Setting Community Boards in Context”, and Richardson, Mary, “Auckland Community Boards”, in Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, Report, Volume 4: Research Papers, Parts 9 and 10.
17. See Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, Report, Volume 3: Summary of Submissions, Chapters 7 and 8.
18. See Chapter 31, “Statutory Reform”.
19. Local Government Commission, Review of the Local Government Act 2002 and Local Electoral Act 2001, Summary Report, Wellington, July 2008, p. 22. Section 3 of the Local Electoral Act sets out its purpose.
20. Local Electoral Act 2001, section 10. Although the current Act dates from 2001, the three-yearly council electoral cycle was carried forward from previous legislation (See Local Elections and Polls Act 1976, section 4).
21. Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Report: Towards a Better Democracy, 1986, (J.H. Wallace, chair), AJHR H.3, pp. 155–166.
22. Ibid., pp. 158–159.
23. Ibid., pp. 164–165. The Royal Commission on the Electoral System saw a need for restraints on governmental powers to precede introduction of a four-year term. This does not arise in the context of local authorities, which have much narrower powers than central government.
24. Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, Report, Volume 3: Summary of Submissions, Chapter 7, p. 87.
25. Local Electoral Act 2001, section 19H.
26. Engstrom, R.L. and McDonald, M.D., “The Effect of At-large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in US Municipalities”, in Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., eds, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York, Algora Publishing, 2003, pp. 203–225, p. 203.
27. Ibid., p. 204.
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